We examine the impact of privatisation on wage formation in unionised labour markets.
Introduction
The late 20th century has witnessed the emergence of a broad consensus among policy makers that private good provision is optimally realised through privately-owned competitive …rms. As a result, comprehensive privatisation programmes have been implemented across the globe, most widely in Europe and Latin America, but also pervasively in a number of countries in Africa and Asia (World Bank, 2005) . When it comes to the evaluation of the economic and social impacts of these reforms, no such consensus has emerged (Claessens and This paper addresses these questions theoretically and empirically. The theoretical model studies the e¤ect of private versus public ownership on wage formation in a setting in which labour earnings are determined in a two-tier system composed of sector-wide collective bargaining and …rm-speci…c "fair wage" policies. Worker e¤ort is endogenous and in ‡uenced by two factors: the degree of job security and what workers consider to be the "fair wage", the latter of which depends on the employer's ability to pay. Private …rms are pro…t maximisers, while public …rms have a broader objective function and also take consumer welfare into account. In addition, the …rm's ownership regime a¤ects the degree of job security, as jobs at state-owned enterprises tend to be more secure than in private ones. A rent-maximising trade union sets a binding wage ‡oor, anticipating its e¤ect on the actually paid "fair wages" and the employment level subsequently set by the …rms.
Privatisation impacts on wage setting incentives in each of these stages. The e¤ect on the union wage ‡oor is not clear-cut. Greater pro…t orientation tends to increase the trade-o¤ between wages and employment faced by the union, thereby depressing wages, while higher worker e¤ort stemming from less job security pulls in the opposite direction. In contrast, privatisation unambiguously increases the mark-up set by the …rm on the union wage ‡oor (the wage cushion), as greater pro…t orientation and increased worker e¤ort mean that private …rms have more rents to share with their workers. Irrespective of the response of the wage ‡oor, the e¤ect on the wage cushion always dominates, implying that going private leads to an unambiguous increase in actual paid wages.
We confront the key predictions of our theory against worker-…rm panel data gathering administrative records on the population of workers, …rms and collective bargaining agreements of the corporate sector in Portugal over the period [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Two features of this dataset make it especially well suited for our purposes. First, it makes it possible to distinguish, at the worker-level, between the wage ‡oor set via collective bargaining and the wage actually paid. Second, the …rm-level records contain precise information on the share of capital that is state-owned in each year. Employing a di¤erences-in-di¤erences strategy, we are therefore able to estimate the e¤ect of private ownership on the wage set in each stage -and hence on the actual paid wage.
The empirical results provide support to the key predictions of our theory: private ownership increases actual paid wages, and this e¤ect is driven by the fact that privatised …rms tend to pay larger mark-ups on the union wage ‡oor. These e¤ects are quantitatively important: our preferred speci…cations suggest that privatisation increases actual paid wages by about 5 to 7 percent, on average. We conduct a number of checks to verify the robustness of this …nding. First, we tackle the issues of endogeneity due to either …rm or worker selection bias. Potential …rm selection bias is addressed by including a lead dummy variable for whether an ownership change occurred in the subsequent year, in order to test for reverse causality. Potential worker selection bias is addressed by estimating spell …xed-e¤ects models which allow us to account for unobserved heterogeneity of both workers and …rms. Second, we account for the bounded nature of our dependent variable by estimating Tobit models. Third, we consider alternative speci…cations of the di¤erent wage measures. Fourth, we consider alternative de…nitions of private ownership. In each of these cases, the main results of the basic model are supported. In a …nal step, we examine whether and how the e¤ects of privatisation are heterogeneous across skill categories, and …nd robust evidence that the positive wage impacts tend to be more pronounced among highly-educated workers.
We contribute to several strands of existing research. Our paper relates closely to the literature on the labour market e¤ects of privatisation, including early work by Haskel and Szymanski (1993) , Bhaskar and Kahn (1995) and La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999). 1 Taking stock of this literature, Brown et al. (2010) emphasise that most studies draw on limited sample sizes, explore short time spans and face di¢ culties in de…ning a control group, which hampers the generality and interpretation of the (often mixed) empirical results. Using comprehensive …rm-level panel data from Hungary, Romania, Russia and Ukraine, they then provide evidence that privatisation led to moderately lower wages. 2 We add to this literature by drawing on linked employer-employee panel data which makes it possible to: i) account for changes in the composition of the workforce; ii) test for the heterogeneity of e¤ects across skill categories, and iii) distinguish, at the individual level, between the union wage ‡oor and the wage actually paid. In addition, we tie the estimation to a theoretical model tailored to the institutional setting under analysis, thereby highlighting several novel mechanisms by which privatisation potentially impacts on wage formation.
In being able to empirically distinguish, at the individual level, between the union wage ‡oor and the actually paid wage, we build on important work by Cardoso and Portugal (2005) , who use the same dataset employed in our paper, but do not examine the impacts of privatisation. 3 More generally, our paper is related to the theoretical and empirical literature on two-tiered wage setting systems, including work by Holden (1988 Holden ( , 1998 , Ordine (1995) , Muysken and van Veen (1996) and Hibbs and Locking (1996) . 4 We are not aware of previous research, either theoretical or empirical, focusing on the e¤ect of privatisation on each stage of the wage determination process.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model linking private and public ownership to wage determination, and derives testable predictions for the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data employed, before Section 4 provides brief background information on the privatisation process in Portugal. Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy and presents the econometric results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Theoretical model
Consider an industry with n identical …rms producing a homogeneous good. The demand for the good is given by the inverse demand function
where q i is the quantity supplied by Firm i. The good is produced using only labour in a constantreturn-to-scale technology. More speci…cally, the production function is given by
where L i measures the number of labour units used and e i is e¤ort per unit of labour. We endogenise worker e¤ort by combining the e¢ ciency wage and fair wage hypotheses. More speci…cally, e¤ort is assumed to dependent on two factors: the degree of job security and what workers consider to be a "fair wage". Applying a modi…ed version of the fair wage hypothesis of Akerlof and Yellen (1990), we assume that worker e¤ort in Firm i is given by
where w i is the actual paid wage by Firm i and w f air i is the wage rate considered to be "fair" by the workers of Firm i. The parameter 1 measures the degree of job security for workers in Firm i. By a standard e¢ ciency wage argument, a higher degree of job security will, all else equal, induce a lower worker e¤ort. Since the e¤ ective wage rate is constant ( 
where w is the contracted wage ‡oor which constitutes the lowest wage the …rm is allowed to pay.
The highest possible wage the …rm can pay is equal to pq i =L i (= e i p). In this case, all the …rm's revenues are distributed to workers as wage payments. We assume that the fair wage is a linear combination of these two extremes, according to a weight 2 (0; 1). 5;6 The wage ‡oor w is set by an industry-wide trade union representing all workers in the industry.
We assume rent-maximising union preferences, implying that the objective function of the union is given by
where r < 1 is the reservation wage, re ‡ecting, for example, unemployment bene…ts or simply the disutility of working.
As regards the …rms, we allow for preferences that deviate from pro…t maximisation by assuming that the objective function of Firm i is given by
5 Our de…nition of the fair wage is similar in spirit to the one used by Danthine and Kurmann (2006) . Akerlof and Yellen (1990) use a somewhat di¤erent internal perspective by assuming that workers of di¤erent skills compare their wages to other co-workers within the same …rm. 6 Our de…nition of the fair wage is also consistent with an alternative assumption about local wage setting, since the wage given by (4) is the wage that would result from e¢ cient Nash bargaining between the …rm and a local rent-maximising union, where is the relative bargaining power of the …rm. is the pro…t of Firm i while
is consumers'surplus. The weight attached to consumer welfare by Firm i is given by the parameter 2 h 0; n . The upper bound on ensures an interior solution with non-negative equilibrium pro…ts in the game considered below.
We assume that the mode of competition is Cournot and consider the following sequence of events:
1. The trade union sets a wage w that constitutes a contracted wage ‡oor applying to all …rms in the industry.
2. Each …rm chooses how many labour units to employ, taking into account the wage rate needed to elicit the desired worker e¤ort.
3. Production takes place and payo¤s are realised.
We solve the game by backwards induction, looking for a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Equilibrium wages
For a given wage ‡oor, w, the optimally chosen level of employment by Firm i is given by the …rst-order condition
Applying symmetry, L i = L and e i = e for i = 1; :::; n, the equilibrium level of employment as a function of the contracted wage ‡oor is
The wage paid by each …rm is then given by
Since all …rms choose the same level of employment and actual wages, the objective function of the central trade union reduces to
The …rst-order condition for an optimally chosen wage ‡oor is
or @w @w
Thus, the optimal wage ‡oor is set at a level where the elasticity of the actual wage premium (w r)
with respect to w is equal to the elasticity of labour demand with respect to w. A higher wage ‡oor increases the fair wage and thereby the actual wage paid by the …rms. However, this comes at the cost of a lower level of employment. The optimal wage ‡oor balances these two considerations and, using (10)- (11), is given by
Setting w = w in (11) yields the actual wage paid in equilibrium:
The di¤erence between the actual paid wage and the wage ‡oor constitutes the wage cushion:
Private versus public ownership
Let us now see how private versus public ownership would a¤ect the equilibrium wages derived above. As in Monteiro et al. (2010), we assume that public …rms di¤er from their private counterparts along two di¤erent dimensions: pro…t orientation and job security for workers. While private …rms are pro…t maximisers ( = 0) we assume that public …rms have a broader objective and also take consumer utility into account ( > 0). Furthermore, we assume maximum job security in public …rms ( = 1) while workers in private …rms have less secure jobs ( < 1). 7 Thus, private …rms are characterised by = 0 and e > 1, while public …rms are characterised by > 0 and e = 1.
When assessing the e¤ect of private versus public ownership on equilibrium wages, we maintain the symmetric market structure (for tractability reasons) and compare the equilibria where all …rms in the industry are either public or private.
Applying the above assumptions, in an industry consisting of private …rms, the equilibrium wage ‡oor is given by
while the actual paid wage is
implying that the wage cushion is
On the other hand, in an industry consisting of only public …rms, equilibrium wages are given by
A comparison of equilibrium wages in the two di¤erent scenarios reveals the following results:
Proposition 1 Going from public to private …rm ownership in industries with two-tier wage setting leads to (i) a lower (higher) wage ‡oor if the reduction in job security is small (high) relative to the increase in pro…t orientation,
(ii) a higher actual paid wage, (iii) a higher wage cushion.
Proof. From (17)- (22) we have
The signs of (24) and (25) are unambiguous. The sign of (23) is determined the sign of the numerator and it is easy to see that it is negative if e is su¢ ciently close to 1, while it is positive if is su¢ ciently close to 0.
The ambiguous e¤ect of private ownership on the equilibrium wage ‡oor is due to two counteracting forces. On the one hand, increased pro…t orientation pulls in the direction of a lower wage ‡oor. Since more pro…t oriented …rms operate with a lower level of output (and thus employment), the drop in employment (and thus the increase in revenue per worker) due to a higher wage ‡oor is smaller. 8 This means that more pro…t-oriented …rm objectives reduce the elasticity of the actual wage premium (w r) with respect to the wage ‡oor. 9 In other words, an increase in the wage ‡oor is to a lesser degree translated into higher actual wages. As follows from (14), the optimal response from the central trade union is therefore to reduce the wage ‡oor. On the other hand, the higher worker e¤ort associated with less job security pulls in the opposite direction. Increased labour productivity reduces the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the wage ‡oor. 10 This means that the loss of employment due to a marginal increase in the wage ‡oor becomes smaller.
All else equal, union utility is therefore maximised at a higher level of w. The relative strength of these two e¤ect determines whether more private ownership leads to a lower or higher wage ‡oor in equilibrium.
In contrast to the ambiguity of the wage ‡oor e¤ect, private ownership unambiguously increases the equilibrium wage cushion. Here, the two aforementioned e¤ects pull in the same direction.
More pro…t oriented …rm objectives imply that pro…ts, and thus revenues per worker, are higher in equilibrium. Increased labour productivity through higher worker e¤ort has the same e¤ect. Since 8 From (10) we have
The absolute value of this expression is increasing in . 9 From (11) we have @w @w
which is increasing in . 1 0 From (10) we have
which is decreasing in e:
private …rms are more able to pay high wages (due to higher revenues per worker), the wage level that workers perceive to be fair is correspondingly higher under private ownership. This translates into a higher equilibrium wage cushion in industries with private …rm ownership.
The e¤ect of private ownership on the actual paid wage is the sum of the e¤ects on the wage ‡oor and the wage cushion. From (16) we see that the actual wage does not depend on in equilibrium.
This means that the e¤ects of the degree of pro…t orientation on the wage ‡oor and the wage cushion exactly cancel each other out. However, since the e¤ect of less job security increases both the wage ‡oor and the wage cushion, the actual wage paid to workers is correspondingly higher in private …rms.
Data
Our empirical analysis draws on data from Quadros de Pessoal for the years 1991 to 2007. This dataset is an administrative census that gathers information on …rms, workers and collective bargaining agreements for the corporate sector in Portugal. It is collected yearly by the Ministry of Employment and participation is compulsory for every …rm with wage earners.
Each …rm is required to provide information about its attributes and those of each employee.
The …rm records include yearly information on number of employees, industry code, geographical location, and percentage of capital that is owned by the state and by foreign investors. Among the set of worker attributes are monthly wages (base wage and other components of pay), gender, schooling, date of starting, occupation and hours worked. Importantly for our purposes, the worker data additionally contain unique identi…ers for the collective bargaining agreement that covers the worker, as well as for the corresponding professional category for bargaining purposes. The …rst digit of the collective agreement identi…er indicates the type of contract that covers the worker (sectoral, multi-…rm, …rm, mandatory regime). The employee records may also be linked to those of the corresponding employer in each year. 11 The information in the Quadros de Pessoal dataset is recognised for its high reliability. In fact, these same administrative records are used by the Ministry of Employment for checking the …rm's compliance with labour law. In addition, these records must be made available to every worker in a public place of the establishment, which reduces the likelihood of misreporting.
A further important feature of these data is that they make it possible to distinguish, at the worker-level, between the union wage ‡oor and the actually paid wage. By comparing the wage information available in Quadros de Pessoal with information on contractual wages for each worker category published in collective agreements, Cardoso and Portugal (2005) show that the mode of the base wage distribution for each professional category within each collective agreement corresponds with remarkable accuracy to the wage that is set via collective bargaining. We follow the same strategy to compute the union wage ‡oor for worker i in year t, w it . The actual paid wage, w it , is then the overall monthly earnings actually received by the worker in year t, including the base wage, tenure-related and other regularly paid components. We perform the estimation on a 20% random sample of workers from these data (preserving all yearly information for the sampled workers). Table 1 provides summary statistics on these data. As can be seen in the …rst column of this table, the actual and base wages received by workers tend to be signi…cantly above the wage ‡oor set via collective bargaining. It is also interesting to notice the relatively high participation of females in the labour market and the low level of schooling of the workforce (7.06 years of formal schooling, on average). In addition to formal education, Quadros de Pessoal makes it possible to construct occupational categories based on the 1988 International Standard Classi…cation of Occupations (ISCO-88). Speci…cally, this classi…cation allows us to de…ne four skill-levels which are based on:
i) the level of general education required to perform a job, and ii) the job-related formal training required to perform a job (ILO, 1990). 12 The summary statistics also show that average worker tenure is relatively high, pointing to relatively long spells of employment in the same …rm. The privatisation programme involved a large number of …rms covering almost all industries.
Privatisation in Portugal
Initially, privatisation took place mainly in the …nancial sector (banking and insurance) but later spread to other services and manufacturing. 14 The process has not yet been concluded but the government has withdrawn its presence in most sectors, such as brewery, paper and pulp, cement, oil and highways. In some strategic sectors (telecommunications and energy) the state has retained a quali…ed stake in capital or special voting rights ('golden shares'), which allows some control of …rm management. The bulk of the privatisation programme was achieved by 1999 with a peak in 1997. Since then the reform has slowed down with very few major …rms being added in the period 2000-07. 1 4 For details about the privatisation programme in Portugal, see Sousa and Cruz (1995) and OECD (2001 OECD ( , 2003 . Figure 1 shows the distribution of privatised …rms across economic sectors found in Quadros de Pessoal (after data cleaning) over the period 1991-2007. Though more dominant in the services sector, it is evident from the …gure that privatisation is extensively spread across most sectors of the economy. In total, 269 …rms were transferred from private to public hands during the period of analysis. In addition, the restructuring process also implied that a substantial number of …rms were transferred from private to public control, while other …rms experienced more than one ownership change during the period of analysis. 15 In our data, these two categories amount to 150 and 89 …rms, respectively. In order to identify the wage e¤ects of private versus public …rm ownership, we withdraw a random sample of workers from a dataset containing all …rms that changed ownership status during the period of analysis, whether privatised or nationalised, as well as all …rms that did not change ownership status, remaining either private or public throughout the period of analysis.
Empirical strategy and results
We are interested in testing whether the key predictions of our model …nd support in the data.
To examine the e¤ect of private versus public ownership on the union wage ‡oor, we adopt the following baseline speci…cation:
where w it is the log of the union wage ‡oor for worker i in year t, and P rivate cat is a dummy variable that equals one if the share of …rms'capital that is privately-owned within the professional category c and collective agreement a that covers worker i in year t exceeds 50%. The set of regressors further includes: x it , a vector of worker attributes; y jt , a vector of characteristics for …rm j at which worker i is employed in year t; z jt , a vector of characteristics of the collective agreement a which covers worker i in year t; i , a pure individual unobserved e¤ect; j , a pure …rm e¤ect; r , a pure region e¤ect; k , a pure industry e¤ect; t , a …xed time e¤ect; and, …nally, it , an exogenous disturbance.
To estimate the e¤ect of private versus public ownership on wages set at the local level, we then turn to the following speci…cation:
w it = P rivate jt + 'w it + x it + y jt + z at + i + j + r + k + t + it (27) where the dependent variable, w it , is the log of the actual wage received by worker i in year t, and P rivate jt is a dummy variable that equals one if the proportion of capital that is privately-owned at …rm j in year t exceeds 50%. In our theoretical model the wage ‡oor constitutes the reference level of pay for determining the optimal "fair wage" (c.f. (4)). Therefore, this variable is included among the set of regressors used in the estimation. The remainder of the regressors have the meaning de…ned in (26) .
The reduced-form e¤ect of privatisation on the actual paid wage is then given by a speci…cation similar to (27) , but where w it is excluded. For robustness, we will adopt several alternative speci…-cations. Notice that we de…ne ownership at di¤erent levels of aggregation in (26) and (27) . In cases where each …rm constitutes only a small share of the total number of …rms involved in a collective bargaining agreement, the impact of each …rm on the bargaining outcome will presumably be limited. Thus, we believe that the e¤ect of private ownership on the wage ‡oor is better explained by de…ning the ownership variable at wage agreement level, taking into account the ownership of all …rms involved in each collective bargaining agreement. On the other hand, when explaining locally set wages, private ownership is naturally de…ned at …rm-level. Below, in subsection 5.2, we test the robustness of this choice by re-estimating (26) using private ownership de…ned at …rm-level instead.
Arguably, the most critical issue in evaluating the a¤ect of ownership changes on wages is how to account for potential selection bias that could contaminate the estimates. In our case, both …rms and workers can be self-selected, for example, if privatised …rms are not randomly assigned and/or workers are able to move freely across …rms with di¤erent ownership status. However, even in the absence of instruments that determine ownership status while being unrelated to wages, we do not believe that selection bias is a major problem in our particular economic context. First, we use workers from non-privatised …rms -either public or private -in the same economic sector and year in a panel regression framework as control groups. Workers from privatised …rms serve as identi…cation of ownership changes for a given …rm while worker …xed-e¤ects allow us to control for time-invariant di¤erences among workers. Second, apart from the four …rms being privatised during the very …rst phase of privatisation, there is no evidence of a systematic selection of privatised …rms in the Portuguese privatisation programme, as detailed in Section 4. The evidence from Table 1 also points to relatively long employment spells of workers within the same …rm, which suggests that the mobility of workers across …rms is relatively low. Furthermore, the employment spells remain fairly stable across …rm ownership types throughout the period of analysis. We nevertheless test explicitly for these two forms of selection bias in subsection 5.2 below. Table 2 reports the results of our basic speci…cation, obtained with worker …xed-e¤ects models. All regressions include the set of worker, …rm and collective agreement controls de…ned above, and also account for industry, year and region …xed-e¤ects. As can be seen in column (1), the coe¢ cient estimate giving the e¤ect of private ownership (de…ned at the category-agreement level) on the wage ‡oor is negative but statistically insigni…cant. This …nding is consistent with the theoretical model presented above, which suggests that this e¤ect is ambiguous, due to counteracting forces of private ownership on the wage setting incentives of organised labour.
Main results
In column (2) we examine the e¤ects of private ownership (de…ned at the …rm-level) on the wage rate set at the local level. In line with our theory, the point estimate on the relationship between the union wage ‡oor and the actual paid wage is positive, statistically signi…cant at the 1% level, and smaller than one. Most importantly, our model predicts that private ownership unambiguously increases the mark-up set by the …rm on the wage ‡oor. This prediction also …nds support in the data: controlling for the union wage ‡oor, private ownership increases the actual paid wage by 6.7% on average, an e¤ect that is estimated with a great degree of precision. Finally, in column (3) we examine the reduced-form e¤ect of private ownership (de…ned at the …rm-level) on actual paid wages without controlling for the union wage ‡oor. In accordance with our theory, and as the empirical results above would suggest, the estimates point to a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of private ownership on actually paid wages. (2) 
Robustness checks
In this section we conduct a number of checks to verify the robustness of our …ndings reported above.
Every regression includes the attributes for workers, …rms and collective bargaining agreements de…ned above. For brevity, we report only the estimated coe¢ cients on the key variables of interest.
Testing for selection bias
Firm selection bias When testing for potential …rm selection bias we follow the strategy proposed by Gruber and Hanratty (1995) and later adopted by Friedberg (1998) and several others.
This informal yet intuitive test of reverse causality consists of including a lead dummy variable for whether an ownership change occurs in the subsequent year. Under the hypothesis of reverse causality or some other type of endogeneity -i.e., if wages determine ownership changes -then the lead dummy should enter signi…cantly. Otherwise, the coe¢ cient on the lead dummy should not be statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Notes: Signi…cance levels: : 10% : 5% : 1%. a Private ownership de…ned at wage agreement in (1) and at worker level in (2) and (3). Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by collective wage agreement in (1) and at …rm level in (2) and (3). The regressions are estimated by spell …xed-e¤ects and include industry, region and time e¤ects.
The results in Table 3 show that the lead dummy is statistically insigni…cant in all three speci…cations, while the magnitudes of the private ownership coe¢ cients remain almost identical to those from Table 2 . Thus, the results from this particular test suggest that our estimates are not contaminated by …rm selection bias.
Worker selection bias Thus far, we have accounted for unobserved worker heterogeneity in the estimation, but not for unobserved …rm heterogeneity. Hence the e¤ects of private ownership on wage determination are identi…ed from both: i) worker mobility across public and privately-owned …rms; and ii) changes over time in the ownership status of a given …rm. Due to potential worker selection bias, though, one might argue that the latter source of variation, alone, is better suited for examining the wage e¤ects of privatisation. For robustness, we therefore re-estimate the basic speci…cation using worker-…rm (or spell) …xed-e¤ects models. In this case, identi…cation of wage e¤ects comes solely from changes over time in wages and ownership status within the same job spell. 16 (2) An inspection of Table 4 reveals that the estimation results remain remarkably similar when this method is adopted instead. In fact, we have veri…ed that none of the key results of the paper hinge upon the choice between worker or worker-…rm …xed-e¤ects models.
Accounting for censoring
Another source of concern about the basic results lies in the fact that both the union wage ‡oor and the actually paid wage are left-censored: the union wage ‡oor cannot fall below the national minimum wage, while the actually paid wage must be above the union wage ‡oor. To account for this, we re-estimate the basic model using Tobit random e¤ects models. Table 5 reports the marginal e¤ects of interest. The elasticity e¤ect of private ownership on the union wage ‡oor (column (1)) remains negative and is now more precisely estimated. We should bear in mind, however, that this method does not allow us to account for idiosyncratic correlation of the standard errors within the same agreement and over time, and hence the standard errors are likely to be biased downwards.
In columns (2) and (3) the marginal e¤ects of interest remain positive and highly signi…cant.
The magnitude of the e¤ects changes somewhat relative to the baseline model, with the elasticity e¤ect of private ownership on the wage ‡oor becoming clearly larger (column (1)) and that on actual wages somewhat smaller -columns (2) and (3). But, most importantly, the qualitative implications of our theory continue to …nd support in the data when this alternative estimation method is used. (1) and at worker level in (2) and (3). The regressions are estimated by tobit random e¤ects and include industry, region and time e¤ects.
Alternative wage and ownership measures
In Table 6 we examine whether the basic results are sensitive to alternative wage and ownership measures. In column (1), we consider the e¤ect of private ownership de…ned at the …rm-level (rather than category-agreement level) on the union wage ‡oor. As before the point estimate is negative, but insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero.
One potential concern about the wage concepts de…ned above is that, in some industries, trade unions might have in ‡uence over tenure-related payments. One might worry, therefore, about the extent to which local wage regressions are indeed capturing …rm-speci…c arrangements due to "fair wage" considerations. To check this, in columns (2) and (3) we examine the e¤ect of privatisation on the actually paid base wage, thereby excluding tenure related and other regular components of pay from actual wages. The results remain quite similar, both qualitatively and quantitatively, suggesting that our main speci…cation is indeed capturing the e¤ects of privatisation on the mark-up set by the …rm on the union wage ‡oor. 
Alternative de…nitions of private ownership
We now turn to whether our results are sensitive to the de…nition of private ownership. Throughout the analysis, we have used the threshold of 50% of private capital to determine whether the …rm is privately-or state-owned. It might be argued, however, that the main forces emphasised by our model, notably changes in the degree of pro…t orientation and job security spurred by privatisation, are likely to begin exerting their in ‡uence over wage setting incentives even before this threshold is reached.
We adopt two alternative de…nitions of private ownership. First, we consider a lower threshold of private capital for de…ning private ownership (40%). The corresponding results, reported in Panel A of Table 7 , show that the results remain remarkably stable when this alternative de…nition is used. Second, we de…ne a privatisation date and use this instead of the threshold level of private capital for de…ning private ownership. We follow the standard practice in the privatisation literature (see, e.g., Megginson et al., 1994) of de…ning the privatisation date as the date of the …rst transfer of property rights from public to private hands (for …rms that eventually reach the threshold level of 50% of private capital). Once more, the results (reported in Panel B) remain qualitatively unchanged. (1) and at worker level in (2) and (3). Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at wage agreement and year in (1) and at …rm level in (2) and (3). The regressions are estimated by worker …xed-e¤ects and include industry, region and time e¤ects.
In a …nal robustness check, we have also veri…ed that the results remain quite similar if the period of analysis is restricted to the years 1991 to 1999, when the bulk of the Portuguese privatisation programme was implemented (results not reported but available upon request).
Heterogeneity of wage e¤ects
In the analysis so far, we have examined average wage impacts of private ownership. However, these wage e¤ects might plausibly vary considerably across skill categories. For instance, in the context of our model, the e¤ort of skilled workers could be more responsive to the degree of job-security, or "fair-wage" considerations could be more important for highly-educated workers. To investigate whether and how the wage e¤ects of private ownership do in fact di¤er between skill groups, we examine interactions between the variable de…ning private ownership and a dummy variable that equals one if the worker has at least 12 years of formal schooling.
The results reported in Table 8 suggest that private ownership exerts a more positive impact on wages in the case of highly-educated workers. In addition, they suggest that this is mainly due to the fact that private …rms tend to pay larger mark-ups on the union wage ‡oor for this type of workers. In light of our theoretical model, a possible explanation could be that …rm productivity depends more strongly on the e¤ort levels of high-skilled workers, implying that increased worker e¤ort due to privatisation more easily translates into higher …nal wages in …rms with a higher skill-share in the workforce. (1) and at worker level in (2) and (3). Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at wage agreement in (1) and at …rm level in (2) and (3). The regressions are estimated by worker …xed-e¤ects and include industry, region and time e¤ects.
Results from additional estimations (not reported but available upon request) con…rm that this …nding is quite stable across estimation methods. We conclude, therefore, that the wage gains stemming from privatisation appear to accrue mainly to highly-educated workers. It should be noted that this result contrasts with La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999), who (perhaps surprisingly) report larger wage gains due to privatisation for blue-collar than for white-collar workers. On the other hand, our result is somewhat more in line with Chong and Leon (2009), who …nd that privatisation has a signi…cantly positive e¤ect on wages for managers but not for production workers.
Concluding remarks
We have examined -theoretically and empirically -the e¤ect of privatisation on wage determination. The theoretical analysis is cast in a setting where actual labour earnings are determined by both sector-wide union wage setting and …rm-speci…c "fair wage" policies; and in which private …rms di¤er from public ones with respect to the degrees of pro…t orientation and job security. We have identi…ed several novel channels whereby privatisation potentially a¤ects wage determination.
Greater pro…t orientation of privately-owned …rms implies that trade unions face a higher trade-o¤ between wages and employment, which tends to depress wages, but higher worker e¤ort stemming from less job security pulls in the opposite direction. The net e¤ect on the wage ‡oor is therefore ambiguous. By contrast, private ownership unambiguously increases the wage cushion, as higher worker e¤ort and greater pro…t orientation mean that private …rms generate more rents to share with their workers. Independent of the impact on the wage ‡oor, the response of the wage cushion always dominates, implying that privatisation leads to an unambiguous increase in actually paid wages.
We have then confronted the key predictions of our model against rich linked worker-…rm data for Portugal spanning the period 1991-2007. This dataset is unique in that it makes it possible to distinguish, at the individual level, between the wage set via sector-wide collective bargaining and …rm-speci…c arrangements establishing a mark-up on the union wage ‡oor. Further, it allows us to follow workers and …rms over the (long) period of time in which important segments of the corporate sector have been privatised.
The econometric results are supportive of the main predictions of our theory. In particular, they provide evidence that private ownership increases actually paid wages, and suggest that this e¤ect is driven by the fact that privatised …rms tend to pay larger mark-ups on the union wage ‡oor. These e¤ects are quantitatively important and are robust to a wide variety of alternative speci…cations. Therefore, our results suggest that when it comes to wage e¤ects the average worker does not have reasons to fear privatisation. We also …nd, however, that the wage impacts of privatisation tend to be heterogeneous across skill categories, with pay rises accruing predominantly to highly-educated workers.
Appendix: De…nition of skill groups
In the econometric analysis, we include a group of dummy variables to control for the skill level associated with the worker's occupation, as de…ned in the ISCO-88 classi…cation. (1) Legislators, senior o¢ cials and managers; (2) Professionals
